Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Assessment of the reaction control system, volume 3 by Prust, Chet D. & Hartman, Dan W.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ASSESSMENT
OF TH E
REACTION CONTROL
SYSTEM
Vol. 3 of 5
26 FEBRUARY 1988
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19900002479 2020-03-20T00:48:52+00:00Z

APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III40X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11140
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD
F m i
IL
rEM
] *
x]
N ]
A ]
J/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
Se
FAILED OFF
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III41X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11141
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1402
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III42X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11142
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1403
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II143X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11143
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1404
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III44X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11144
RJDF2A F3 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 6
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1405
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III45X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11145
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1406
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III46X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11146
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ 3 [ 3 [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
C ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1407
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III47X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11147
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1408
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III48X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11148
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1409
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III49X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2035-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11149
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD LOGIC SWITCH 12
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1410
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III50X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11150
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1411
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III51X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11151
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1412
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III52X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11152
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1413
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IlI53X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11153
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1414
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III54X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2036-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11154
RJDF2A F4/F5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 13
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF
THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1415
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III55X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11155
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1416
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11156X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11156
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1417
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III57X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11157
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1418
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III58X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11158
RJDF2B L5/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE RAISED ABOVE WAS
DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206. THEREFORE, THE
ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1419
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III59X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2041-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11159
RJDF2B LS/F5/R5 MANIFOLD DRIVER SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [
] IX]*
] IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1420
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III60X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11160
MANIFOLD I, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1421
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III61X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11161
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C I ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1422
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III62X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11162
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1423
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III63X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11163
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1424
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II164X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11164
MANIFOLD i, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 14
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1425
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III65X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11165
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1426
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III66X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11166
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ _ [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1427
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-III67X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11167
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1428
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III68X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11168
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1429
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III69X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11169
MANIFOLD 2, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 15
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1430
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III70X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11170
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1431
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III71X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11171
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1432
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III72X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11172
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E J E ] t ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1433
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III73X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11173
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1434
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III74X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11174
MANIFOLD 3, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 16
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1435
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11175X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11175
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1436
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III76X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11176
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1437
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III77X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11177
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1438
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III78X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11178
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1439
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III79X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2037-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11179
MANIFOLD 4, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 17
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1440
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-IIIS0X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11180
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1441
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III81X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11181
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1442
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II182X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11182
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1443
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III83X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11183
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1444
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III84X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2042-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11184
MANIFOLD 5, JETS HEATER CONTROL SWITCH 18
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1445
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III85X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11185
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1446
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III86X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11186
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1447
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III87X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11187
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1448
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III88X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11188
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1449
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III89X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2038-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11189
SWITCH, TOGGLE RCS/OMS HEATERS FWD RCS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1450
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III90X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2033-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
II190
SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1451
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III91X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2034-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11191
SWITCH ROTARY, RCS/OMS PRESS
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
LOSE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND PRESSURES.
[ ]
[ ]
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1452
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
FRCS-III92X
05-6KF-2157-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
FRCS
11192
METER, RCS/OMS PROPELLANT QUANTITY GAUGE
D. HARTMAN
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1453
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11193X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11193
METER, RT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK PRESSURES.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1454
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11194X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2158-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11194
METER, LT OMS/RCS PRESSURE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
LOSE ACCURATE DATA CONCERNING ULLAGE AND TANK PRESSURES.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON
112o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1455
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III95X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2302-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11195
SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF2
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1456
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11196X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11196
SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF3
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOk [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SIGNAL CONDITIONER NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS ITS
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER AT THE MEETING ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1457
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III97X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2303-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11197
SIGNAL CONDITIONER OF4
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1458
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III98X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11198
JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1459
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-III99X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11199
JET DRIVER (PRIMARY-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1460
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II200X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
11200
JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1461
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II201X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FRCS
112O1
JET DRIVER (VERNIER-ALL)
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
JET DRIVER FMEA HAS BEEN DELETED. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE RJDS WERE PART OF THE GN&C
ANALYSIS. IOA RECOMMENDS A REFERENCE TO THE GN&C FMEAS BE MADE
IN THE RCS EPD&C FMEAS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1462
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II202X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11202
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THESE DIODES WERE PART OF THE
HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THEY BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1463
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II203X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11203
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DIODES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR INCLUSION
INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE DIODES WERE PART OF THE HELIUM
ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA RECOMMENDS THEY
BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1464
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II204X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11204
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C3/2 R ] C P ] C P ] C p ] C ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
HELIUM TANK ISOLATION VALVE ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1465
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II205X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11205
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1466
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II206X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11206
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] C N ] C N ] [ N ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] C P ] C A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1467
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: FRCS-II207X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11207
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
RE-MARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1468
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II208X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11208
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1469
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II209X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11209
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]*
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1470
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II210X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11210
ITEM: MICROSWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MICROSWITCHES NOT ADDRESSED BY A FMEA. IOA RECOMMENDS THEIR
INCLUSION INTO A FMEA.
SUBSYSTEM MANAGER STATED THAT THE MICROSWITCH WAS PART OF THE
MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE 1-4 ASSEMBLY. FOR COMPLETENESS, IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1471
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II211X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11211
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1472
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II212X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2252-3
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11212
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY. B SCREEN SHOULD BE "NA" BECAUSE
ISOLATION OF A LEAK IS A STANDBY FUNCTION.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1473
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II213X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBS YSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11213
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1474
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II214X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11214
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1475
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II215X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11215
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1476
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II216X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11216
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
H DW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1477
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II217X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11217
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT JETS CAUSES INABILITY TO EXPEL PROPELLANTS
TO MEET CG LIMITS.
NO FMEA EXISTS FOR THIS FAILURE. CRITICALITY ISSUE IS TIED TO
THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED OFF THRUSTERS.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1478
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-11218X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11218
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1479
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II219X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-I
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11219
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[F] [P]
IF] [P]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1480
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: FRCS-II220X
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KF-2266-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: FRCS
MDAC ID: 11220
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1481
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
FRCS-II221X
05-6KF-2258-3
FRCS
11221
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] [N]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE INABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE, CAUSING LOSS
OF VERNIERS THUS MISSION OPERATIONS.
ISSUE IS TIED TO THE IOA HARDWARE CRITICALITY FOR THE FAILED
CLOSED MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1482
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1302
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1302
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1483
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1303
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1303
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1484
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1304
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1304
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1485
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1305
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1305
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES W_TH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1486
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1306
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1306
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1487
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1307
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1307
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1488
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1308
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1308
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1489
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1309
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1309
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1490
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1310
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1310
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1491
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1311
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1311
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1492
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1312
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1312
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1493
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1313
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1313
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/IR] [F]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1494
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1314
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1314
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1495
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1315
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1315
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1496
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1316
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1316
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1497
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1317
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2176-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1317
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1498
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1318
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1318
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1499
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1319
05-6KA-2251-2
ARCS
1319
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1500
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1320
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ x ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1320
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] CN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] I: ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1501
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1321
05-6KA-2251-2
ARCS
1321
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1502
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1322
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1322
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [N] [ ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1503
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1323
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1323
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1504
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1324
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1324
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1505
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1325
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1325
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
C ] [ ] C ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1506
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1326
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1326
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1507
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1327
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1327
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1508
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1328
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1328
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1509
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1329
05-6KA-2251-2
ARCS
1329
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1510
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1330
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1330
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1511
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1331
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2251-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1331
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLI GHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1512
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1332
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1332
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] C N ] C ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1513
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-1333
05-6KA-2252-2
ARCS
1333
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] [F] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1514
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1334
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1334
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1515
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1335
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2252-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1335
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1516
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1336
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1336
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1517
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1337
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2267-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1337
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B C
] C ] [
] C ] [
] C ] C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1518
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1338
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1338
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1519
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1339
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1339
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
C ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1520
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1340
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1340
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1521
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1341
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1341
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE2/26/88 C-1522
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1342
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1342
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1523
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1343
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1343
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]_ [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1524
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1344
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1344
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1525
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1345
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1345
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1526
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1346
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1346
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1527
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1347
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1347
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1528
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1348
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1348
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1529
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1349
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1349
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1530
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1350
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1350
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1531
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1351
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1351
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1532
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1352
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1352
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1533
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1353
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1353
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1534
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1354
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1354
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1535
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1355
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1355
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1536
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1356
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1356
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1537
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1357
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2202-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1357
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1538
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1358
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1358
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R 3 [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1539
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1359
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1359
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1540
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1360
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1360
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1541
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1361
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2201-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1361
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1542
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1362
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1362
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1543
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1363
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1363
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1544
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1364
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1364
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1545
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1365
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1365
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1546
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1366
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1366
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1547
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1367
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1367
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1548
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1368
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1368
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1549
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1369
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1369
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1550
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1370
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1370
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1551
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1371
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1371
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1552
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1372
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1372
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1553
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1373
NASA FM_EA #: 05-6KA-2077-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1373
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1554
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1374
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1374
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1555
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1375
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1375
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 ATMEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1556
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1376
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1376
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1557
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1377
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1377
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1558
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1378
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1378
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1559
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1379
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1379
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1560
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1380
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1380
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1561
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1381
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1381
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1562
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1382
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1382
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1563
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1383
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1383
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1564
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1384
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1384
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1565
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1385
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1385
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1566
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1386
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1386
RESISTOR, 5. IK 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1567
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1387
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2076-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1387
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1568
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1388
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1388
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1569
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1389
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1389
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 13 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1570
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1390
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1390
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1571
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1391
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1391
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1572
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1392
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1392
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1573
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1393
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2078-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1393
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1574
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1394
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1394
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1575
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1395
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1395
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1576
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1396
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1396
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1577
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1397
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2077-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1397
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FOR THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1578
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1398
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1398
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[N] [N] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1579
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1399
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1399
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1580
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1400
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1400
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1581
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS-1401
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1401
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1582
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1402
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1402
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1583
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1403
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1403
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1584
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1404
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1404
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B-SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1585
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS - 14 05
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1405
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1586
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1406
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1406
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] CP] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1587
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YS TEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1407
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1407
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1588
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1408
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1408
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1589
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1409
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1409
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1590
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1410
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1410
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
IF] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1591
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS II, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1411
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1411
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
CX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1592
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1412
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1412
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
CN] IN] CN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
HELIUM OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE A & B SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12076X-12080X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1593 (. _5
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1413
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2151-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1413
L/R HE OX & FU ISOL VLV A OR B SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1594
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1414
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1414
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R3 [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1595
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1415
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1415
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1596
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1416
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1416
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-I PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORTDATE 2/26/88 C-1597
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1417
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1417
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-1 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1598
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
ARCS-1418
03-2A-203350-I
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
1418
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[p]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1599
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1419
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1419
L/R HE OX TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ 3
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1600
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1420
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1420
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1601
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1421
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1421
L/R HE FU TANK PRESS-2 PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1602
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1422
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1422
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1603
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
ARCS-1423
03-2A-203360-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
1423
L/R HE OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
D. HARTMAN
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1604
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1424
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1424
L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1605
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1425
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203360-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1425
L/R HE FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1606
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1426
ARCS
1426
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1607
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1427
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1427
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1608
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1428
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1428
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1609
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1429
ARCS
1429
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1610
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1430
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1430
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1611
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1431
ARCS
1431
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUN C A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1612
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1432 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1432
DIODE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
IF] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12086X-12101X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1613
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1433
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1433
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12086X-12101X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1614
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1434 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1434
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1615
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1435 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1435
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1616
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1436
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1436
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1617
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1437
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1437
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS: INADEQUATE [ ]
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1618
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1438 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1438
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1619
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1439 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1439
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1620
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1440
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1440
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1621
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1441
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1441
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5
DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12107X-
12124X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1622
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1442
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1442
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12130X-12145X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1623
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1443
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE C N /N ]
ARCS
1443
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
CN] [N] CN]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 DIODES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12130X-12145X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1624
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1444
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1444
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ] [ P ]
CN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12151X-12166X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1625
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1445
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1445
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 DIODES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12151X-12166X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1626
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1446
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1446
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD I, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12192X-12207X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1627
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1447
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1447
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD I, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12192X-12207X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1628
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1448
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1448
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY
DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD
ISOLATION VALVE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1629
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1449
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1449
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON
VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1630
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1450
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1450
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12208X-12223X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1631
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1451
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1451
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #2 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12208X-12223X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1632
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1452
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2269-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1452
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
FALSELY FAILING THE VALVES CLOSED. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY
DRAWN ON VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD
ISOLATION VALVE.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1633
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1453
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1453
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IN] [N] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA. NOTE: DIODES INCORRECTLY DRAWN ON
VS70-943099 SHEET 44 FOR THE AFT RIGHT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1634
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1454
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1454
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12224X-12239X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1635
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1455 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1455
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / _ [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER MCA #3 DIODES
RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12224X-12239X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1636
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1456
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1456
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C 3 /2R ] C P ] C P ] C P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATION.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1637
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
ARCS-1457
05-6KA-2269-2
ARCS
1457
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1638
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1458
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1458
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS
12240X-12255X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1639
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1459
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDACID: 1459
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
MCA #3 DIODES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS
12240X-12255X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1640
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1460
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1460
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATION.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1641
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1461
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2269-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1461
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1642
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1462 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1462
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1643
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS-1463
ARCS
1463
DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1644
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1464 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1464
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1645
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1465 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1465
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1646
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1466
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1466
DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1647
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1467 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1467
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1648
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1468
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1468
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1649
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1469 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1469
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1650
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1470 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1470
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1651
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1471
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1471
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1652
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1472
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1472
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1653
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1473
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1473
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1654
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1474
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1474
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1655
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1475
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2206-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1475
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1656
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1476
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1476
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1657
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1477
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1477
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1658
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1478
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1478
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFOR, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1659
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1479
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1479
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
CIL
ITEM
C x] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFOR, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1660
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1480
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1480
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1661
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1481
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1481
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1662
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1482
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1482
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1663
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1483
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1483
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1664
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1484
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1484
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1665
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1485
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2207-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1485
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1666
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1486
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1486
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1667
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1487
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2219-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1487
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1668
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1488
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1488
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1669
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1489
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1489
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1670
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1490
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1490
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1671
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1491
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1491
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
3
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1672
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1492
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1492
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1673
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WOR/_ HEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1493
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1493
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1674
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1494
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1494
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1675
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1495
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2217-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1495
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1676
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1496
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1496
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1677
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1497
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1497
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/1R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1678
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1498
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1498
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[P] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1679
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1499
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1499
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [F]
[ ] [N]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1680
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1500
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1500
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1681
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1501
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1501
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1682
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1502
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1502
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1683
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1503
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1503
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1684
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1504
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1504
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1685
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1505
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1505
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C p ] [ p ] C p ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1686
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1506
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1506
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1687
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1507
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1507
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1688
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1508
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1508
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1689
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1509
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1509
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1690
P
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1510
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1510
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE STATUS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1691
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1511
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2208-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1511
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1692
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1512 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1512
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1693
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1513
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1513
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_mc A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1694
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1514 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1514
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1695
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1515
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1515
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] C P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1696
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1516
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1516
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1697
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA # :
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1517 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1517
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1698
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1518 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1518
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1699
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1519
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1519
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1700
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1520 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1520
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1701
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1521
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1521
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1702
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1522 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1522
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1703
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1523
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS
1523
DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [p] [p]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1704
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1524
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1524
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1705
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1525
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2003-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1525
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
B
[P]
[p]
[ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1706
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1526
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1526
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1707
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1527
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2004-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1527
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1708
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1528
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1528
ITEM: FUSE, IA
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1709
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1529
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1529
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 3 [ ]
[ 3/2R] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1710
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1530
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2016-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1530
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1711
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1531
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1531
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1712
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1532
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1532
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1713
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1533
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1533
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1714
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1534
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2014-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1534
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1715
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1535
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1535
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1716
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1536
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1536
ITEM: FUSE,, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1717
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1537
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1537
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1718
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1538
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2005-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1538
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [P]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1719
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1539 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1539
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1720
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1540
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1540
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1721
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1541
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1541
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1722
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1542
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1542
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [x]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1723
r.
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1543
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1543
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1724
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1544
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2136-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1544
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] IX]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE 1/2 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1545
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1545
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
z/2o/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1546
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1546
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /ZR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1547
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1547
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
OPERATIONS THUS LOSS OF MISSION. INABILITY TO CROSSFEED DURING
AN RTLS/TAL ABORT MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1548
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2126-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1548
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1549
05-6KA-2137-I
ARCS
1549
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A
[p]
[ P ]
[ ]
B
[p]
[ F ]
[ N ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1550
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1550
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[x] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TALMAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1731
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1551
NASA FMRA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1551
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
OF A LEAK.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1552
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1552
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1553
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1553
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1554
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2137-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1554
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE CAUSES THE
INABILITY TO CLOSE 3/4/5 VALVE. THIS PREVENTS CROSSFEED
CAPABILITY THUS LOSS OF MISSION OPERATIONS. INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED DURING RTLS/TAL MAY CAUSE INCOMPLETE OMS ABORT DUMP.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1555
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1555
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH BOTH. INABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE PREVENTS ISOLATION
OF A LEAK.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1556
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2127-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1556
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
[p] IF] [P] [X]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY SECOND LEG OF 3/4/5 AND CROSSFEED LEG. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
PREVENTS PROPELLANTS TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING
WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1737
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1557
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1557
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1738
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1558
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1558
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK. NOTE: NASA FMEA
INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIES RELAY 56V76AII6K44. IT SHOULD BE
56V76AII6K46.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1739
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1559
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1559
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1740
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1560
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1560
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
r
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1741
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1561
05-6KA-2132-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1561
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1562
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1562
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1743
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1563
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1563
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1744
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1564
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1564
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOK [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1745
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1565
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1565
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1746
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1566
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1566
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1747
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1567
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1567
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. FAILURE CAUSES INABILITY
TO CROSSFEED WITH THE GPC. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED WITH SWITCH AND
OTHER GPC COMMANDS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY CAUSES INABILITY TO
CROSSFEED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1748
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1568
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2133-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1568
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE
THE VALVE TO ISOLATE A THRUSTER LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1749
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1569
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1569
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] .
[x]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1750
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1570
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1570
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1751
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1571
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1571
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1752
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1572
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2132-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1572
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1753
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1573
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1573
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1754
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1574
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1574
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1755
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1575
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1575
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
IN] IN]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1756
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1576
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1576
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (I/i ABORT)
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1757
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1577
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1577
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1758
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1578
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1578
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS •
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1759
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1579
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2128-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1579
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
CN] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1760
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1580
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1580
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1761
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1581
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1581
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
.DW/nmc
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[p]
[p]
[ ]
B
[p]
[ F ]
[N]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1762
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1582
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1582
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1763
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1583
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1583
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ]
B C
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1764
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1584
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1584
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/i ABORT)
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1765
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
ARCS-1585
05-6KA-2128-I
ARCS
1585
RELAY
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CP]
CP]
C ]
B
CP]
CF]
IN]
C
[ P ]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
CX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1586
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1586
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ 3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
CP] [P] [P] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE WILL CLOSE
THE VALVE AND CAUSE INABILITY TO RE-OPEN IT CAUSING LOSS OF JETS.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY PREVENTS PROPELLANTS
TO BE EXPELLED TO MEET LANDING WEIGHT CONSTRAINTS.
LOSS OF MANIFOLD THRUSTERS DURING RTLS/TAL ABORT COULD RESULT IN
INABILITY TO COMPLETE A PROPELLANT DUMP (i/I ABORT)
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1767
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1587
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1587
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/IR] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1768
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1588
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2128A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1588
ITEM: RELAY
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. WITH RELAY FAILED HIGH,
LOSE CAPABILITY TO CLOSE VALVE. THIS, COUPLED WITH THE LOSS OF
ALL HARDWARE REDUNDANCY, MAY PREVENT ISOLATION OF A THRUSTER
LEAK.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1589
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1589
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1590
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1590
RESISTOR, 12K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1591
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1591
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1592
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1592
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1593
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1593
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1774
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1594
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1594
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1595
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1595
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1596
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1596
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1597
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1597
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1598
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1598
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT CREDIBLE. IOA
RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1599
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1599
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1780
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1600
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2083-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1600
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1601
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1601
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1602
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2082-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1602
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1783
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1603
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1603
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1784
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1604
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1604
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1605
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2081-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1605
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1786
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1606
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1606
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1787 _2_
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1607
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1607
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1788
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1608
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1608
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1789
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1609
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1609
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1790
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1610
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1610
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1791
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1611
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1611
RESISTOR, 5. IK i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1792
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1612
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1612
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1793
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1613
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1613
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1794
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1614
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1614
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1795
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1615
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1615
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1796
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1616
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1616
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1797
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1617
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1617
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1798
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1618
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1618
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1799
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1619
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1619
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1800
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1620
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1620
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1801
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1621
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1621
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1802
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1622
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1622
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1803
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1623
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1623
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1804
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1624
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1624
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1805
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1625
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1625
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1806
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1626
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1626
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
_DW/nmC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1807
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1627
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1627
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1808
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1628
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1628
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1809
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1629
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1629
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1810
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1630
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2085-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1630
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1811
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1631
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1631
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1812
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1632
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1632
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1813
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1633
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1633
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1814
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1634
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1634
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1815
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1635
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2086-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1635
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1816
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1636
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1636
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA INCORRECTLY IDENTIFIED THIS RESISTOR AS A FAILURE (FAILED
SHORT). RLR TYPE RESISTORS CANNOT FAIL SHORT.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1817
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1637
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1637
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
N_A [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1818
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1638
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2084-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1638
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1819
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1639
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1639
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1820
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1640
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1640
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1821
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1641
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1641
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1822
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1642
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1642
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1823
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1643
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1643
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1824
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1644
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1644
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1825
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1645
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1645
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1826
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1646
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1646
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3/3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1827
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1647
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1647
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1828
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1648
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1648
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1829
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1649
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1649
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE HAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY HAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1830
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1650
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1650
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1831
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1651
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1651
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1832
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1652
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1652
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1833
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1653
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1653
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1834
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1654
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1654
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1835
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1655
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1655
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE
CLOSED.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1836
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1656
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1656
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOARECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1837
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1657
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
1657
RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
CIL
ITEM
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1838
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1658
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1658
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1839
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1659
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1659
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1840
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1660
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1660
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1841
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1661
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1661
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1842
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1662
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1662
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1120188.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1843
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1663
NASA FME #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1663
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1844
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1664
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1664
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1845
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1665
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1665
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1846
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1666
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1666
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1847
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1667
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2103-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1667
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1848
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1668
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1668
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS THIS RESISTOR IS A CREDIBLE FAILURE. IOA
RECOMMENDS THIS FAILURE BE INCORPORATED INTO A FMEA.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT THE MEETING WITH THE SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON
1/2o/s8.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1849
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1669
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1669
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1850
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1670
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1670
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
NDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1851
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENTID: ARCS-1671
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1671
RESISTOR, 12K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCYSCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1852
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1672
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2108-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1672
ITEM: RESISTOR, 12K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1853
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1673
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1673
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
•CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADWDELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1854
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1674
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2102-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1674
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1855
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1675
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1675
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1856
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1676
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1676
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1857
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1677
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1677
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1858
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1678
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1678
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1859
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1679
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1679
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1860
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1680
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1680
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1861
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1681
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1681
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCYMAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1862
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1682
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1682
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1863
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1683
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1683
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1864
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1684
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1684
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1865
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1685
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1685
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1866
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1686
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1686
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1867
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1687
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1687
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1868
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1688
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1688
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1869
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1689
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1689
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1870
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1690
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1690
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1871
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1691
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1691
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1872
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1692
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1692
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1873
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1693
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1693
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1874
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1694
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1694
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1875
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1695
NASA FMEA # : 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1695
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1876
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1696
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1696
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1877
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1697
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1697
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1878
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1698
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1698
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1879
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1699
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1699
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P _ [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1880
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1700
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1700
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1881
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1701
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1701
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1882
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1702
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ,]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1702
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1883
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1703
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1703
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1884
c6
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1704
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1704
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1885
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1705
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1705
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1886
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1706
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1706
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1887
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1707
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1707
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1888
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1708
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1708
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1889
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1709
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1709
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1890
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1710
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1710
RESISTOR, 5. IK i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1891
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1711
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1711
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F J [ P _ [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1892
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1712
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1712
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] •
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1893
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1713
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1713
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
_[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1894
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1714
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1714
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1895
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1715
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1715
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1896
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1716
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1716
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1897
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1717
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1717
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ J [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1898
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1718
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1718
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1899
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1719
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1719
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1900
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1720
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2087-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1720
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED) .
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1901
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1721
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1721
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] C P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1902
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1722
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1722
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1903
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1723
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1723
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 12R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1904
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1724
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1724
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1905
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1725
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1725
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1906
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1726
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2089-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1726
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1907
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1727
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1727
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from N_A)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1908
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1728
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1728
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1909
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1729
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1729
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1910
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1730
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2088-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1730
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
A SHORT ACROSS A RLR TYPE RESISTOR IS NOT A CREDIBLE FAILURE.
IOA RECOMMENDS REMOVAL OF THE "SHORT" FAILURE MODE FROM THIS
FMEA.
ISSUE RESOLVED ON 1/20/88 AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER
(SHORT FAILURE MODE TO BE REMOVED).
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1911
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS- 1731
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1731
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1912
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1732
ARCS
1732
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1913
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1733
ARCS
1733
RESISTOR, 5. IK i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1914
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
ARCS-1734
ARCS
1734
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
[ ] [ ] *
[ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1915
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1735
ARCS
1735
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1916
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1736
ARCS
1736
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1917
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1737
ARCS
1737
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1918
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1738
ARCS
1738
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1919
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1739
ARCS
1739
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/_C A B C
C ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1920
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1740
ARCS
1740
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1921
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
NASA DATA:
ARCS-1741 BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1741
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1922
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1742
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1742
RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1923
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1743
ARCS
1743
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1924
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1744
ARCS
1744
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1925
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1745
ARCS
1745
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1926
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1746
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1746
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1927
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1747
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1747
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [p] [p]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1928
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1748
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1748
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1929
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1749
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1749
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1930
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS- 1750
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
1, 2
ARCS
1750
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] IN] IN] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1931
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1751
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1751
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ -] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1932
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1752
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
ARCS
1752
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1933
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1753
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1753
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
NASA C / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1934
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1754
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1754
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1935
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1755
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
ARCS
1755
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3/IR] [P]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1936
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1756
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1756
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1937
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1757
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1757
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1938
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1758
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1758
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1939
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1759
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1759
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC CONTACTS
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1940
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS Ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1760
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1760
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1941
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1761
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1761
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12081X-12085X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1942
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1762
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1762
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1943
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1763
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1763
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1944
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1764
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1764
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1945
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1765
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1765
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1946
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1766
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1766
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1947
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1767
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
ARCS
1767
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1948
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1768
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1768
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1949
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1769
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1769
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1950
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1770
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CLOSE CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1770
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
OXIDIZER AND FUEL TANK ISOLATION VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED
BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12102X-12106X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1951
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1771
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1771
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1952
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1772
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMP_ [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1772
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1953
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE :
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1773
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1773
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1954
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1774
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1774
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZERAND FUEL CRosSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1955
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1775
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1775
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FuEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1956
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1776
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1776
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1957
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1777
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1777
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1958
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1778
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1778
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1959
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1779
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1779
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[P] [P] CP]
IN] CN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZERAND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1960
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1780
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1780
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
C ] *
[ ]
t J
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1961
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1781
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
ARCS
1781
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ -] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1962
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1782
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1782
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1963
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1783
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, i0
ARCS
1783
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH GPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1964
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1784
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1784
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV i/2 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1965
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1785
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID"
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
ARCS
1785
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 SWITCH CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 1/2 SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12125X-12129X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1966
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
ARCS-1786
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1786
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [p]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1967
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1787
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1787
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1968
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1788
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1788
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1969
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1789
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1789
ITEM: MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH FEED FROM RIGHT OR
FEED FROM LEFT SWITCH CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ x ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
MASTER RCS CROSSFEED SWITCH 36 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE
ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12167X-12171X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1970
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1790
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1790
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1971
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1791
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1791
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1972
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1792
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1792
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1973
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1793
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1793
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1974
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1794
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1794
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1975
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1795
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1795
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1976
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1796
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1796
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1977
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1797
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1797
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1978
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1798
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1798
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IF] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1979
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST :
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1799
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1799
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1980
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1800
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1800
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1981
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1801
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1801
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COXPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1982
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, i0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1802
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1802
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1983
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1803
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1803
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
C P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1984
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 11, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1804
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1804
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 3/4/5 SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
IX]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LEFT AND RIGHT OXIDIZER AND FUEL CROSSFEED VALVE 3/4/5 SWITCH RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12146X-12150X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1985
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1805
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1805
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1986
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1806
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1806
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD I, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1987
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1807
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1807
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 1, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1988
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1808
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1808
MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1989
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1809
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1809
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1990
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1810
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1810
MANIFOLD 1, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1991
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1811
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1811
MANIFOLD I, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD I, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1992
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1812
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1812
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1993
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1813
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1813
MANIFOLD i, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD i, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCH RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12172X-
12176X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1994
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1814
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1814
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
_K_Xs:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1995
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1815
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1815
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1996
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1816
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1816
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1997
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1817
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
ARCS
1817
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] CN] [N] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1998
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1818
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
ARCS
1818
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUELAND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-1999
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1819
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1819
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2000
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1820
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1820
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2001
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1821
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1821
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2002
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1822
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1822
MANIFOLD 2, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A .B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
Ix]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 2, LEFT AND RIGHT, FUEL AND OXIDIZER SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12177X-12181X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2003
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1823
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1823
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2004
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1824
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1824
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
C ]
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2005
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1825
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1825
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] [N] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2006
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1826
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1826
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [p]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2007
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1827
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
ARCS
1827
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2008
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1828
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1828
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2009
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1829
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1829
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] E ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2010
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1830
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1830
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2011
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1831
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1831
MANIFOLD 3, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD 3, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL SWITCHES RE-
ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12182X-12186X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2012
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1832
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1832
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2013
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1833
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1833
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2014
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1834
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1834
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2015
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1835
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1835
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[x]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2016
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS- 1836
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1836
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2017
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1837
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND 3, 4
ARCS
1837
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2018
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1838
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1838
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2019
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1839
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1839
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2020
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMMAND 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1840
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1840
MANIFOLD 4, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] C ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
MANIFOLD 4, LEFT AND RIGHT, OXIDIZER AND FUEL ISOLATION VALVE
SWITCHES RE-ANALYZED BY IOA. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12187X-
12191X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2021
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1841
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1841
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] C ] C ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2022
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1842
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1842
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[N] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2023
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1843
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
ARCS
1843
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] [N]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2024
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS I, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1844
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
NASA [ / ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
ARCS
1844
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2025
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS i, 2
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1845
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C ]
ARCS
1845
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE C N /N ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2026
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1846
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1846
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2027
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 3, 4
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1847
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW C ]
ARCS
1847
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2028
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1848
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1848
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA [ / ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2029
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 5, 6
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1849
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1849
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2030
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1850
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1850
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[X]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2031
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE:
ASSESSMENTID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1851
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 7, 8
ARCS
1851
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH OPEN
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2032
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS 9, I0
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1852
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1852
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD IsoLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2033
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1853
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM :
CONTACTS 9, i0
ARCS
1853
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH GPC
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA
IOA
[ / ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [N] [N] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2034
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1854
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
ARCS
1854
-MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2035
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
CONTACTS ii, 12
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
ARCS-1855
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
ARCS
1855
MANIFOLD 5, L/R OX & FU ISOL VLV SWITCH CLOSE
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ F ] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
[X]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
AFT MANIFOLD ISOLATION VALVE #5 RE-ANALYZED BY IOA DUE TO CHANGE
IN CIRCUITRY. SEE ASSESSMENT IDs ARCS 12001X-12075X.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2036
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1856
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2159-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1856
L/R OX & FU CROSSFEED VLV 1/2 & 3/4/5 SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /.2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH IOA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2037
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1857
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2153-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
1857
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 1/2 SWITCH TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ,
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2038
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1858
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] .[ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2039
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1858A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2154-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS
1858
L/R OX & FU TK ISOL VLV 3/4/5 A OR B SWITCH
D. HARTMAN
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
IN] IN] IN]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2040
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1859
MANIFOLD i, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE
LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE POSITION. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD TO FALSELY FAILING THE
VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION OPERATIONS.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2041
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1859A
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2155-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
TALKBACK
ARCS
1859
MANIFOLD I, 2, 3, 4, 5, L/R OX & FU VLV SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
THIS FAILURE MAY CAUSE LOSS OF ACCURATE INDICATION OF THE VALVE
POSITION. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY MAY LEAD
TO FALSELY FAILING THE VALVE CLOSED, POSSIBLY EFFECTING MISSION
OPERATIONS.
ISSUE NOT RESOLVED AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2042
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1860
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1860
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2043
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1861
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1861
L/R FU TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
C P ] C P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2044
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1862
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1862
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2045
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1863
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1863
L/R FU TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2046
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1864
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1864
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ N ] [ N ]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2047
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1865
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1865
L/R OX TANK ULLAGE PPRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2048
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1866
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
ARCS
1866
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2049
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1867
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203350-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1867
L/R OX TANK OUT PRESS SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2050
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1868
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1868
L/R FU TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[P]
[ ]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] -C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2051
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1869
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1869
L/R FU TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ P ]
[ ]
IN]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]-
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RE_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2052
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1870
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1870
L/R OX TANK TEMP-1 TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ 3
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMP_ [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / 3 [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2053
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1871
NASA FMEA #: 03-2A-203365-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1871
L/R OX TANK TEMP-I TEMP SENSOR
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/2R] [P]
[3/3 ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2054
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1872
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1872
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2055
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1873
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1873
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2056
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1874
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1874
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2057
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1875
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1875
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2058
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1876
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1876
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2059
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1877
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1877
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2060
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COHPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1878
05-6KA-2180-2
ARCS
1878
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
C ] C ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2061
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1879
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1879
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2062
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1880
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1880
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2063
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1881
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1881
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2064
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1882
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1882
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASAI224H [/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2065
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1883
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1883
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2066
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1884
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1884
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D&a4680H]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2067
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1885
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1885
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2068
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
ARCS-1886
05-6KA-2180-2
ARCS
1886
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] C ]
C ] [ ]
[ ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2069
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1887
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1887
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2070
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1888
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1888
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2071
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1889
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1889
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2072
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1890
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1890
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2073
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1891
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1891
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2074
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1892
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1892
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2075
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1893
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1893
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2076
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1894
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1894
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2077
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1895
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1895
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2078
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1896
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1896
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTIONRATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2079
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1897
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1897
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2080
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1898
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1898
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2081
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1899
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1899
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2082
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1900
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2179-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1900
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A S C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2083
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-1901
05-6KA-2179-I
ARCS
1901
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] [ P ]
CP] CP]
[ ] C ]
c
[ P 3
[P]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2084
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1902
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1902
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2085
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1903
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2180-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1903
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2086
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1904
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ARCS
1904
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2087
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1905
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1905
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2088
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1906
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1906
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS RPC INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2089
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1907
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2184-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
ARCS
1907
CONTROLLER, REMOTE POWER
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2090
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1908
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1908
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2091
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1909
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1909
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2092
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1910
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1910
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2093
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1911
NASA P24EA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1911
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
B
[F]
[ F ]
[ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2094
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1912
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1912
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2095
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1913
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1913
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2096
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1914
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1914
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2097
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1915
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1915
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2098
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1916
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1916
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
]
]
]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2099
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1917
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1917
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2100
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1918
05-6KA-2271-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1918
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2101
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1919
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2271-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1919
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPA_ [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ /. ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2102
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1920
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1920
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2103
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1921
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1921
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2104
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1922
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1922
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 1 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2105
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1923
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1923
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2106
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1924
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1924
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2107
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1925
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1925
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2108
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1926
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1926
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] _[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
c / J c 1 i 3 c
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2109
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1927
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1927
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[p] [F]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2110
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1928
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1928
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2111
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1929
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1929
ITEM: DIODE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2112
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1930
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1930
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] [F] [P]
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2113
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1931
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1931
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2114
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1932
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1932
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
IF] [P]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2115
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1933
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1933
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[x]*
Ix]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C_ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2116
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1934
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1934
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2117
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1935
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1935
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2118
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1936
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1936
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2119
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
ARCS-1937
05-6KA-2259A-I
ARCS
1937
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[p] IF]
[P] IF]
[ ] [ ]
C
CP]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2120
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1938
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1938
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[p] IF] [P]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2121
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1939
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1939
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
B
IF]
[F]
[ ]
C
[P]
[P]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2122
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1940
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1940
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[P]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2123
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1941
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1941
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2124
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1942
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1942
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2125
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1943
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1943
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2126
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1944
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1944
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2127
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1945
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1945
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2128
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
ARCS-1946
05-6KA-2271-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1946
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2129
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
ARCS-1947
05-6KA-2271-I
ARCS
1947
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2130
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1948
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1948
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2131
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1949
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1949
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[X]*
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2132
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1950
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1950
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2133
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1951
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1951
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[P]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX]*
[X]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RF_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2134
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1952
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1952
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2135
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1953
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1953
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
RYe:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2136
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1954
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1954
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2137
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1955
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1955
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2138
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1956
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1956
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/_NC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2139
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1957
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1957
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2140
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1958
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1958
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ 3 [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2141
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
ARCS-1959
05-6KA-2265-I
ARCS
1959
DIODE
D. HARTMAN
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[P] [F]
[P] [F]
[ ] [ ]
C
[ P ]
[ P ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
Ix]*
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2142
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1960
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1960
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2143
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1961
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1961
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2144
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1962
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1962
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2145
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1963
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1963
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2146
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1964
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1964
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[F] [P]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2147
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1965
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA"
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1965
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2148
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1966
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1966
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[3/2R] [P]
C ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2149
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1967
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1967
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2150
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1968
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1968
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2151
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1969
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1969
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2152
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1970
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1970
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ .]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2153
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1971
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2259A-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1971
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2154
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1972
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1972
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA
IOA
[3/3 ] [ ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2155
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1973
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2265-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1973
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2156
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1974
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1974
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
C ] *
Cx]
COMPARE C /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2157
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1975
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2260-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1975
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2158
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1976
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1976
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ 3
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2159
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1977
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1977
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2160
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1978
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1978
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2161
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1979
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2270-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1979
ITEM: DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2162
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1980
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1980
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(AD_DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2163
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1981
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1981
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2164
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1982
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1982
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2165
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1983
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1983
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ] •
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2166
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1984
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1984
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2167
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1985
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1985
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2168
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1986
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1986
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
ClL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3./3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2169
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1987
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1987
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2170
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1988
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1988
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DE_TE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2171
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1989
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1989
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2172
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1990
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1990
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2173
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1991
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-1
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1991
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ]
B
[P]
[P]
[ ]
C
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2174
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1992
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1992
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2175
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1993
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1993
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2176
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1994
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1994
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER OPERATING
ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2177
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1995
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2214-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1995
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REM_:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2178
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1996
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1996
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2179
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1997
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1997
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2180
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1998
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1998
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONTAINS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS FAILURE ALONE HAS NO
EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2181
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-1999
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2220-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 1999
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2182
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2000
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2000
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST : D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ 3 [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [D]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2183
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2001
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2001
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2184
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2002
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-2
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2002
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA CONSIDERS MULTIPLE FAILURES. THIS DRIVER INADVERTENTLY
OPERATING ALONE HAS NO EFFECT.
AT MEETING WITH SUBSYSTEM MANAGER ON 1/20/88, NSTS 22206 WAS
DISCUSSED. IT WAS AGREED UPON THAT THE ISSUE (MULTIPLE FAILURES)
WAS RAISED DUE TO DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF NSTS 22206.
THEREFORE, THIS ISSUE REMAINS OPEN.
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2185
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2003
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2185-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2003
ITEM: DRIVER, HYBRID
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x ] *
[x]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2186
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2004
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2004
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2187
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2005
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2005
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2188
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2006
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2006
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE :
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2189
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2007
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2007
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
IX]
C N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2190
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARC-2008
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2008
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
C ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2191
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2009
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2009
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2192
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2010
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2010
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2193
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2011
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2011
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2194
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2012
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2012
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ]- [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2195
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2013
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2013
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
IX] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ]. [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2196
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2014
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2009-I
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2014
ITEM: FUSE, 2A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ ] *
[x]
IN]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2197
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2015
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2015
ITEM: FUSE, 1A
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2198
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2016
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2008-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2016
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2199
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: ARCS-2017
NASA FMEA #: 05-6KA-2007-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: ARCS
MDAC ID: 2017
ITEM: FUSE, IA
LEAD ANALYST: D. HARTMAN
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
IOA AGREES WITH NASA FMEA.
[ ]
[ ]
REPORT DATE 2/26/88 C-2200


